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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD E. BEST and
EARL CRAIG,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 8438

BIG JIM MINING COMPANY,
A Nevada Corporation
Defendant and Appellant
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court in and for San Juan County, adjudging
that defendant Big Jim Mining Company, a Nevada
corporation, had abandoned the assignment of a
lease and enterprise with regard to a piece of mining property and had committed a forfeiture of
its rights thereunder. The judgment went on to
declare the lease assignment abandoned, forfeited,
and cancelled, to quiet title therein, and to require
reassignment of the lease. Damages were not
awarded. (See Judgment)
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The complaint of plaintiff alleges in Paragraph 2 that in June, 1953 plaintiff was granted
a uranium and vanadium mineral lease by the Utah
State Land Board covering all of Section 16, Township 36 South, Range 25 East, Salt Lake Meridian.
The lease was admitted in defendant's answer, as
was its assignment to Herman Stern as attorney
for the defendant. A copy of the assignment, itself
constituting the agreement between the parties, is
attached to the complaint as Exhibit B, and its
execution is admitted.

It is alleged in Paragraph 4, and admitted, that
"on or about the 12th day of November, 1953, the
Big Jim Mining Company accepted said assignmen t . . . "
Succeeding paragraphs, placed in issue by defendant in its answer, assert that defendant had
failed to fulfill its obligations under its assignment
and had abandoned the property, and failed to pay
the sum of $5,500 to plaintiff.
The agreement between the parties, Exhibit
B, around the interpretation and performance of
which issues arose, provides among other things
for a survey of the property by defendant. It also
provides for the payment by defendant to plaintiff
of the sum of $5,500 if a mine on adjoining pro2
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perty intersects the leased property or if an Atomic
Energy Commission drill report is satisfactory.
Further provisions are made for the payment
of a minimum of $250.00 a year, commencing with
the calendar year 1959, by the defendant to plaintiff against gross mill receipts derived from the
property.
In its answer, defendant denied any breach
and affirmatively raised the issue in Paragraph 8
that plaintiff was not the real party',finterest.
A pretrial hearing was held, but no written
pretrial order was ever entered. At the trial, defendant was not permitted to examine concerning
the issue of real party in interest. However, upon
motion of counsel for plaintiff Best, one Earl Craig
was joined as plaintiff upon the court's order, (R.
45) without sworn testimony and over the objection of defendant's counsel.
Judgment was for plaintiffs in the respects
above described; motion for new trial was made and
denied, and this appeal followed.
Many of the points raised in this appeal deal
with the failure of the ev~dence to support the
judgment of the trial court, particularly with regard to the issues of abandonment and forfeiture.
Because of this, it has been necessary to discuss
8
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this evidence at some length within each of these
sections. To avoid duplication and since such discussion is believed to constitute compliance with the
Appendix of Forms of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
Form 32, permitting subdivision of the fact statement, the facts will not again be set forth here at
length.
POINTS
POINT I. THE FINDING AND CONCLUSION OF
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT
ABANDONED THE LEASE IS TOTALLY UNSUPPORTED BY, AND CONTRARY TO THE PREPONDERANCE OF, THE EVIDENCE, AND IS CONTRARY
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND APPUCABLE PRECEDENTS.
POINT II. THE FINDING AND CONCLUSION OF
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT
COMMITTED A FORFEITURE OF ITS RIGHTS UN:
DER THE ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT IS TOTALLY
UNSUPPORTED BY, AND CONTRARY TO, THE EVIDENCE, AND IS CONTRARY TO PRINCIPLES OF
JUSTICE· AND APPLICABLE PRECEDENTS.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXPLICITLY FIND OR CONCLUDE THAT THE CONTRACT OF DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF BEST WAS
UNENFORCEABLE BY REASON OF LACK OF MUTUALITY; BUT IF SUCH FINDING OR CONCLUSION
BE DEEMED IMPLICIT, IT IS TOTALLY CONTRARY
TO ALL EVIDENCE AND TO THE AUTHORITIES.
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND INJUSTICE IN PERMITTING AMENDMENT AS TO PARTIES PLAINTIFF AT
4
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THE TRIAL WITHOUT SWORN TESTIMONY, WHILE
AT THE SAME TIME DENYING TO DEFENDANT
THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THE IMPORTANT ISSUE
OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST, WHICH DEFEN-DANT HAD SPECIFICALLY RAISED AS AN ISSUE
BY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN ITS ANSWER.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE FINDING AND CONCLUSION OF
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT
ABANDONED THE LEASE IS TOTALLY UNSUPPORTED BY, AND CONTRARY TO THE PREPONDERANCE OF, THE EVIDENCE, AND IS CONTRARY
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND APPLICABLE PRECEDENTS.

Neither the evidence, nor justice, nor applicable precedent, support the view of the trial court
that the defendant has abandoned the lease assignment or enterprise.
All the evidence and principles of justice and
all the law is to the contrary.
The court, in its erroneous conclusions of law,
stated:
"1. That the plaintiffs are entitled to
the decree of this court that the defendant
has abandoned the assignment of the lease
of said School Section 16 and has abandoned
the enterprise contemplated therein."
This conclusion is based upon findings of fact,
which will be demonstrated themselves to be either
unsupported by the evidence, or irrelevant, to the
effect that the defendant could abandon the con5
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templated enterprise, and did so. (Findings of
Fact 7 and 8.)
The trial court could not and did not arrive
at its conclusion of abandonment by the support of
substantial evidence in the case. That would not
have been possible; for the evidence, properly understood, shows plainly that there was never any intent to abandon or any abandonment by the defendant of its rights. Rather, as will be demonstrated
in this section of the brief, the evidence shows that
the defendant fulfilled every obligation and pressed
on with diligence to the fulfillment of its obligations, expending large sums of money in an earnest
effort to make the entire undertaking worthwhile
both to itself and plaintiff.
Abandonment of a property or enterprise, unlike forfeiture, is not a matter of breach or claimed
breach of an obligation. Rather, it depends upon
the volition and the action of the holder of the right,
which must coincide to show clearly that the right
has been relinquished and given up. We will show
that neither of these essential prerequisites have,
upon any theory, been here fulfilled.
Simply for a definition and discussion of the
requisites of abandonment, we turn to the California case of Los Angeles v. Abbott, (1933) 129 Cal.
App. 144, 18 Pac. 2d 785, wliere it is stated:
6
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"Abandonment includes the intention to
abandon, and the external act by which such
intention is carried into effect." (Page 787,
Pacific Reporter citation.)
In the Abbott case the opinion of the reviewing
court points out that the characteristic element of
abandonment is voluntary relinquishment by intentional repudiation.
In Berry v. Kelly (1949) 90 Cal. App. (2d)
486, 203 Pac. (2d) 80, the reviewing court reversed
a judgment of abandonment, holding that, despite
delay in drilling a well, there was "no substantial
evidence upon which the trial court could base a
finding that defendant had abandoned ... " (Page
81, Pacific Reporter citation.)
The evidence in the Berry case was that defendants had closed operations for several years. But
the reviewing court said at page 81, citing several
authorities:
"Abandonment cannot be inferred unless it can fairly be shown that nonuse by
lessee is coupled with an intent to relinquish
all rights in the premises.''
In the· light of the above cases and definitions,
let us turn to an examination of the present case
and of thE •evidence relating to the question of
abandonment. It will be clear this evidence does
not support a finding of abandonment.
7
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RE ABANDONMENT
The evidence shows by the testimony of plaintiff Best that the assignment of the lease was signed
in June, 1953. (R. 9)
Plaintiff Best further testified that the Big
Jim Corporation was to be formed.
The Big Jim Mining Company, a Nevada corporation, was duly formed, around the end of the
summer of 1953. (R. 61.) It was formed for the
specific purpose of dealing with the mining property
whose lease was assigned by plaintiff Best (R. 61);
this is the testimony of Mr. Jack Egar, president
of the corporation, and whose testimony in tb
regard was apparently not challenged.
The corporation, formed for the very purpose
of dealing with the lease here in question, set out
at once, and continuingly, to achieve the purpose of
pushing forward its project. Almost all testimony
in this regard is virtually uncontradicted and unshaken.
The defendant had a mining survey made (R.
65). It hired a mining engineer in Grand J un~tion
in August, 1953. (R. 65.) It received reports in
June and October, 1953. It obtained an Atomic
Energy Commission report (also unfavorable)
around April, 1954. (R. 71.) It employed and paid
8
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Frank Wicks to interpret and explain these reports
(R. 68, 70, 71).
When Wicks interpreted the reports as unfavorable, the defendant's board of directors conferred
on further action, and, Mr. Egar testified:
''It was decided that I should try to interest other people in the property." ( R. 70.)
Perservering, Mr. Egar in June, 1954, "took
a trip to New York to see Mr. Schultz of Lehman
Brothers who are investment brokers." (R. 72.)
In New York Mr. Egar discussed the property
with Mr. Schultz but was turned down on the basis
'~f the unfavorable reports. (R. 72.)
Mr. Egar made other efforts and contacted a
firm in the mining business, Shattuck Denn Mining
Corporation of New York. On June 8, 1954, Mr.
Egar spoke to the president of this concern. (R. 74.)
Around July 1, 1954, in a long distance telephone conversation with the president of the Shattuck Denn concern, Mr. Egar was finally notified
that Shattuck Denn did not desire to go forward
with regard to the property. (R. 75.)
Defendant's efforts continued. Mr. Egar saw
more people about the property; all had their geologists look at the property. (R. 75.) Among others
approached were Mr. Blair W. Stewart of the Mudd
9
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interests, m1n1ng and oil people in Los Angeles
( R. 85). The defendant received a letter ( Defendant's Exhibit 4) of October 4, 1954, which said
in part:

"I am sorry to so have to advise you of
our conclusion but wish to express Otlr appreciation of your splendid cooperation and
patience with us.''
Continuing still further, the defendant mare
contact and arranged a deal with Federal Uranium
Corporation regarding the lease; stock of Federal
Uranium was to be transferred to defendant. (R.
130.)
Other activity of the defendant corporation included payment of the necessary rental to the State
of Utah for 1954 and 1955 as required by the lease.
In summary, then, we see that, despite the
unfortunately unfavorable reports, the activity of
the defendant corporation was single-minded and
continuing. In what sense does this constitute abandonment?
The trial court, so far as facual basis for
abandonment is concerned, apparently relied heavily, if not exclusively, upon a letter of Mr. Stern, an
attorney for defendant. This letter, which is in
evidence by stipulation (R. 8), is Exhibit K attached to plaintiff's Request for Admissions filed
.
'
March 26, 1955.
10
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This letter of April 30, 1954, in response to insistent demands by plaintiff Best, states that,
upon certain conditions, the directors of defendant
would execute an assignment. These conditions appear to include the following:
1.

That plaintiff Best's then attorney should
pr~pare the assignment. (There is no showing this
was ever done.)
2. That plaintiff Best should return to the
defendant a sum of money paid by it to him. (There
is no showing this was ever done.)
3. That plaintiff Best should repay to defendant two-thirds of the annual rent paid by the
defendant. (There is no showing this was ever
done.)
Thus, we have here at most a yielding to pressure, conditional upon the fulfillment of several prerequisites, of which none were ever complied with.
This can indicate neither abandonment nor the
intent to abandon. The necessary conclusion of nonabandonment is still further reinforced by the circumstances under which the letter of April 30, 1954
was written.
It must be noted that the original assignment
by plaintiff Best had been made, according to the
allegations of plaintiff himself, only on July 17,
11
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1953 (Complaint, Paragr~ph 3), less than ten
months earlier.

Further, the acceptance of this assignment and
agreement had been first made by defendant, according to the allegations of said plaintiff himself,
only on November 12, 1953 (Complaint Paragraph
4), only about five months earlier.
Yet, despite the continuing activities of defendant, carried on in the face of the most discouraging
reports, plaintiff Best, (Exhibit C to Interrogatories to Party Defendant, filed March 12, 1955)
through his attorney, in a letter of April 26, 1954,
placed upon defendant the heaviest pressure to reassign the lease. The letter states flatly that "demand is hereby made upon you to reassign said
lease to H. E. Best."
The April 26, 1954 communication goes on to
threaten, although politely:
"As time appare11tly is of the essence,
this must be done as rapidly as possible. We
therefore hope that you will be good enough to
give us your prompt consideration and courtesy in this matter, rather than to necessitate
a prolonged law suit and the damages which
might flow therefrom ... "

* *

*

*

Thus the evidence shows that even the highly
conditional (and never carried out) offer to re12
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assign of April 30, 1954, was a reluctant response
to the direct and insistent pressure of the legal representative of Best himself. Surely then it cannot
be deemed to constitute or afford any substantial
evidence of abandonment.
Nor, of course, can the continuing and finally
successful efforts of defendant to interest someone
else in the property, above detailed, constitute evidence that defendant intended to or did abandon
the deal. Rather, such efforts necessarily constitute
clear and convincing evidence of the efforts of defendant to carry out its contract.
As is stated in the case of Baldwin v. Jacobs,
(1918 182 Iowa 789, 166 N.W. 271, 272, an assignment or subletting is not an abandonment, but
rather, an assertion of right to the lease. So defendant here sought to assert its right.

Where then is the evidence of abandonment?
It is lacking. As common sense and the cases tells
us, a tentative, partial and and conditional offer to
yield to pressure of lessor to surrender does not
constitute an abandonment; it ill behooves plaintiff
to take this inequitable position. See Becker v. Rute
(1940) 228 Ia. 533, 293 N.W. 18, 21.
Even a letter saying that the lessee did not
consider further development at the time justified,
was not held abandonment. Fischer v. Petroleum Co.
13
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(1943) 156 Kan. 367, 133 Pac. (2d) 95, 101, opinion adhered to on rehearing in 156 Kan. 722, 137
Pac. (2d) 139.
Nor does the fact that defendant, working to
advance prospects, was not physicially on the premises, operate as an abandonment, Crane v. French,
(1940) 39 Cal. App. (2d) 642, 104 Pac. (2d) 53,
60. There must be clear proof of intent to abandon.
In summary, it is clear on the facts and the
law that there is no substantial evidence supporting
a finding of abandonment. Rather the evidence
clearly shows that defendant, in the face of severe
difficulties and discouragements, pusl1ed onward
continually in its effort to further and advance the
property. This Honorable Court should, it is respectfully submitted, so hold.
POINT II. THE FINDING AND CONCLUSION OF
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT
COMMITTED A FORFEITURE OF ITS RIGHTS UNDER THE ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT IS TOTALLY
UNSUPPORTED BY, AND CONTRARY TO, THE EVIDENCE, AND IS CONTRARY TO PRINCIPLES OF
JUSTICE AND APPLICABLE PRECEDENTS.

The trial court found, and found upon no substantial evidence, and contrary to the strong preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant failed to operate and develop the property with reasonable diligence. (Finding of Fact 12) sufficient to
14
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meet its obligation under the contemplated enterprise. It then concluded that the lease had been
abandoned.
The trial court erred grossly in several vital
ways, which we shall show in this section of A.ppellant's Brief, and summarize briefly in this introductory portion of the section.
A. In the first place, the contract does not
in any way contain provisions requiring instant
mining of the property, whether or not such mining
is economically feasible, and to imply such a provision is both totally illogical and contrary to precedent.
B. In the second place, the defendant in this
case fulfilled and over-fulfilled its obligations under the contract. It established a $20,000 corporation for the sole purpose of dealing with the property. It undertook many obligations, and earnestly
carried them out, spending substantial sums and
seeking development of the property in face of severe
discouragements.
C. In the third place, even if somehow the
contract could be misconstrued and tortured into
terms that would somehow support a conclusion of
breach of same terms by the defendant, such supposed breach could never, under law or principles
of justice, be held sufficient to warrant anything
more than granting of damages.
15
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In further portions of this section, we will
discuss greater detail the principles and propositions above set forth.
A. The Contract Does Not Provide For Immediate Mining Regardless of Feasibility, But
Rather Provides Impliedly For Reasonable Efforts
By Defendant.
The trial court found a breach of contract,
despite the continuing efforts of the defendant in
attempting, and finally succeeding, in finding persons to invest in and furtl1er the interests of the
property.
But where are the provisions that were supposedly breached with regard to operation of the
property? Let us examine some of the obligations
undertaken - and performed.
A. The defendant promised to have a licensed
surveyor survey the leasehold imn1ediately.
Defendant, without contradiction or question
fulfilled this obligation. (R. 65.)
B. The defendant promised to pay $5,500 if
either of two contingencies occurred. Neither of
them happened. Admittedly, the mine on the next
property did not adjoin the leasehold (R. 94.) and
the Atomic Energy Commission drill report was
unsatisfactory without any contrary evidence whatever.
16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C. Big Jim promised to reimburse Best for
certain travel expenses, at the time the $5,500 might
be paid.
D. Defendant promised to "commence operations, weather permitting, as soon as possible."
What does this mean, and what can it mean, in
the terms of the contract? It must mean, and it does
mean, that the surveying operations and the securing of the Atomic Energy Commission report,
must be undertaken promptly. There is nothing
to the contrary in the record.
The trial court mistakenly took the view that
the contract should and must, and therefore did,
contain a provision requiring the mining of the property, and unconditionally, even without regard to
whether the land could properly and profi~ably be
mined.
The precedents, in Utah and elsewhere, contradict the trial court's position. Thus, in Monfort v.
Lanyon Zinc Co., ( 1903) 67 Kan. 310, 72 Pac. 784,
it was held that where the contract so provided, a
contract was sufficiently complied with where rent
was paid but mineral exploration was not carried
on.
The correct view of law in such a situation is
that any implied covenant creates no further obligation than the employment of reasonable and prudent diligence.
17
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Thus, in Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co. (C.C.A.
8, 1905) 140 Fed. 801, 811-12, the court held that
the large expense of exploration and development,
and the fact that the lessee bears the loss of failure,
require and entitle the lessee to protect his own interests and not to proceed beyond the point of profit.
Speal-(ing of an asserted breach of an implied
covenant to develop, the court's opinion in the Brewster case stated:
" ... no breach can occur save where the
absence of such diligence is both certain and
substantial in view of the actual circumstances at the time, as distinguished from
mere expectations on the part of the lessor
and conjecture on the part of mining enthusiasts. The large expense incident to the work
of exploration and development, and the fact
that the lessee must bear the loss if the operations are not successful, require that he proceed with due regard to his own interests,
as well as those of the lessor. No obligation
rests on him to carry the operations beyond
the point where they will be profitable to
him, even if some benefit to the lessor will
result from them."
This same principle, 'vith an approving quotation from the Brewster case, was clearly enunciated
in the later case of Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co. (1943) 156 Kan. 367, 133 Pac. (2d) 95, 101,
opinion adhered to on reheari11g in 156 Kan. 722,
137 Pac. (2d) 139. See also Sauder v. Mid-Conti18
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nent Petroleum Corp. 292 U. S. 272, 54 S. Ct. 671
78 L.Ed. 1255, 93 A.L.R. 454, and cases collected
at 2 Summers on Oil & Gas, Perm. Ed. § 414, p. 368,
footnote 29.
In the present case the trial court has erroneously placed upon defendant's shoulders the burden of providing that it had in nowise breached any
implied covenant. This, it is submitted, defendant
did clearly show, while plaintiff brought forward no
evidence tending to prove any breach of an implied
covenant to develop under the circumstances.
Actually, the burden to disprove a breach of
such a covenant should not even have been placed on
defendant. As is clearly set forth in Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., supra:
"A lessor who alleges breach of the implied covenant to develop has the burden of
showing, by substantial evidence, that the
covenant has been breached. He must prove
that the lessee has not acted with reasonable
diligence under the facts and circumstances
of the particular situation. 24 Am. Jur. 661,
§ 184; 2 Thornton, Oil and Gas, 858, and
cases cited footnote 177; 2 Summers, Oil and
Gas, Perm. Ed., § 414, pp. 367, 368."
The interpretation of the trial court would
impose upon the defendant not the express, but the
implied obligation, to mine the property at once,
and regardless of whether an intersecting mine was
19
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available,. or whether surveys revealed the existence
of any minable ore on the property.
Such an obligation was not assumed. To undertake such an obligation would be not impossible
-but foolish, reckless and unreasonable.
Could the trial court properly assume that the
defendant here in entering into the contract behaved
foolishly, recklessly unreasonably? And this in the
teeth of the contract provision providing for minimum rental payments commencing not instantlybut in 1959, thus affording a measure of the time
perspectives in which the parties were proceeding?
The questions provide their own plain answers.
Of course the defendant assumed no such hidden
mysterious obligations. Of course the trial court
erred proposing to impose such obligations when
the contract did not.
A good Utah analagy to the present case is
that of Caine v. Hagenbarth (1910) 37 Utah 69,
106 Pac. 945, where this court also overturned a
trial court decision purporting to place a heavy implied obligation on the purchaser of a mining interest.
The opinion of the court there said - and the
words are here almost precisely applicable:
" . . the parties to the contract in question were therefore dealing with things whose
20
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value, in the very nature of things, was uncertain and speculative . . . "We are further
convinced that if such a promise had been
squarely demanded by the respondents from
appellant, he would promptly have refused
to make it. Moreover, the demand of respondents in view of what they had to sell and did
sell is unfair, unjust and wholly inequitable."
In the instant case also the respondents sold
a mining interest whose value "in the very nature
of things, was uncertain and speculative."
Here as in the Caine case, if an explicit promise to mine at once in any eventuality had been demanded, it would undoubtedly have been refused.
Here as in the Caine case the demand of the
plaintiff to imply such provision "is unfair, unjust
and wholly inequitable."

*

* *

*

The trial court here favored a forfeiture, and
failed to require clear or any proof by the plaintiff
of the issue of forfeiture. By its course, the court
came squarely into conflict with the virtually uniform course of decisions in Utah and elsewhere disfavoring forfeiture.
Thus, in the case of Munson v. A. & H. Inv. Co.
(1923) 62 Utah 13, 218 Pac. 109, this court reversed on appeal a judgment of forfeiture. In so
doing, the court's opinion stated at page 21:
21
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"Forfeitures are not and never have been
regarded by the courts with any special f~vor;
and where a party insists upon a forfeiture
he must make clear proof and show that he is
entitled to it. It has ever been regarded as a
harsh way of terminating contracts, and for
this reason he who seeks to avail himself of
the privileges must be held strictly within the
limits of the authority which gives the right.
2 W arvelle on Vendors, § 807.
"If the contract specifies what defaults
or breaches of conditions shall be ground for
forfeiture, it governs the rights of the parties
in this respect, and a forfeiture on other
grounds not included in the contract will not
be sustained.' 2 Black on Rescission of Contracts, §418; Cughan v. Larson, 13 N.D. 373,
100 N.W. 1088.
" 'Such forfeitures are sustained only
when the parties have contracted therefor,
and the terms of the contract will not be extended to sustain forfeitures.' 39 Cyc. 1373.
"Tested by these principles, the forfeiture claimed . . . cannot be sustained.
"The forfeiture, to be upheld, must be
authorized by the express provisions of the
con tract . . .''
There can be no doubt that in this case, as in
was not authorized by the express provisions of the
the Munson case, the forfeiture that was declared
contract and cannot be upheld.
In another Utah case, that of Howortl~ v. Mills
(1923) 62 Utah 574, 221 Pac. 165, this court again
22
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took the view that ''the courts are not going to compel a forfeiture, which is abhorrent to all courts,
unless the contract requires it."
In refusing to enforce a forfeiture in the Howorth case, the unanimous opinion of the co-urt
stated at page 579:
"In so holding we are not only enforcing
the terms of the contract in question as written and as intended by the parties, but we are
also enforcing the universally recognized
principle that forfeitures are not favored by
the courts, and will be enforced only when it
is clear that such was the manifest intention
of the parties . . . ''
See also Alford v. Dennis (Kan. 1918) 170
Pac. 1006, again expressing the well-known principle that equity is reluctant to enforce a forfeiture,
and even more reluctant to do so where such forfeiture is sought on the basis of no express covenant.
And see Chandler v. Hart (1911) 161 Cal. 445,
119 Pac. 516, 519.
B. On Any Sustainable Interpretation of the
Agreement, Defendant Has Complied With Its Obligations.
If the contract be interpreted as requiring that
the defendant despite unfavorable reports push forward energetically to seek development of the property as might be feasible, the defendant once again
23
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has complied. It has striven diligently to secure this
development, by interesting others in the property.
(The details and record citations dealing with this
effort are contained in the section showing lack of
abandonment, and this Court is respectfully referred
to that section . Repitition would be needless.)
The defendant did what was reasonable under
the circumstances. What shall be done, to further
the· contra~t, when a mine tunnel does not run to
the edge of the property, though plaintiff Best had
indicated plainly he believed it did?
Plaintiff Best himself testified (R. 25) :
''I stepped off and showed the distance
to the furthest drift back in the mine and
stated I thought the end of that drift might
be on the property."
He persisted in this position even after the signing of the contract, and as late as August 20, 1953,
when he wrote in a letter to Mr. Stern, attorney
for defenda11t (Defendant's Exhibit 1):
"I have just returned from a conference
with Mr. Yetter and Mr. Clark of Engineers
Associates. They have finished the map of
their survey of the school section and the
mine. The back one fourth of the mine is on
our property."
When these expectations were disappointed
and reports proved unfavorable, what provision of
the contract requires immediate mining? The plain
24
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and simple answer is that no provision. requires it,
nor does justice or logic require it, nor do any
of the applicable cases requir~ it.
Thus, in the case of Rose v. Lanyon Zinc Co.
( 1903) 68 Kan. 176, 74 Pac. 625, the reviewing
court held that where the lease did not itself provide for the sinking of a well, they would not write
in such a term. The court's opinion comments in
acidly tui·ning down the argument that the contract
should somehow be considered as implying the need
for drilling a well :
"If that were the purpose of the parties,
the English language furnished abundant
means to express it." (Page 628, Pacific Reporter Citation.)
The court further stated:
"If plaintiffs should desire to contract
for an immediate exploration, they must have
that right; and if they should desire to give
an oil or gas company five years in which to
sink a well, upon a consideration satisfactory
to themselves, and as the result of negotiations free from imposition and fraud, they
must have that right. But having deliberately
made a contract of the latter description, they
have no right to call upon a court to declare
that it is of the other kind ... "
The trial court must not, in interpreting the
contracts of parties, disregard or torture the provisions stated. This was done here, in imposing upon
25

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the defendant obligations never expressed; and yet
this is contrary both to common sense and the consensus of legal authority and precedent both in Utah
and elsewhere.
Thus, in the instructive and important case
of Johnson v. Geddes (1916) 49 Utah 137, 161 Pac.
910, this court sternly reversed a lower court holding that purchasers of a mineral land interest were
required to pay moneys under a contract whether
or not they obtained these moneys by sale of minerals extracted.
Said Justice Frick:
"At the threshold of this controversy we
are again reminded that courts are created
to enforce, and not to make contracts. In
other words, unless it is shown that the contract in question was obtained by fraud, oppression or duress, or that it is against law
or public policy, or is unconscionable, it is the
duty of the courts to enforce it according to
its terms and not by forced construction to
modify or disregard it." (Page 145).
Particularly apposite also is the response of the
court to the contention that since certain of the
moneys were to be payable only upo11 the actual obtaining of it from mining, there was a necessarily
implied obligation to mine, regardless of the profitableness of such operation. To this tl1e court's opinion sharply replied:
26
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"The defendants did not, certainly not in
express terms, agree to work and develop the
mining claims. No doubt it was their intention to do that, and no doubt it was assumed
by the plaintiffs that they would do so. There
is, however, nothing in the contract, that
obligates the defendants to do so at any time
nor within what any one else might consider
to be a reasonable time. If the plaintiffs had
desired such a contract they should have demanded it ... " (Page 148).
Even if it should eventually come about that
the sellers of the mineral interest should not receive
moneys out of proceeds from mining, the court
pointed out, this was the contract of the parties.
Too, the moneys -vvere not specified to be paid within any particular time.
Finally, the court points out that any remedy
the plaintiffs migl).t have for breach should be for
damages only, in a court of law. This is the expression of the court:
"Courts of law are always open for such
actions, and courts of equity may act only
when the remedy at law is inadequate . . .
Neither can a court of equity give relief merely because under a long-time contract the
parties did not forsee and provide for all possible emergencies that might arise."
The forceful applicability of the principles of
the Geddes case is plain. Especially is this so when
one considers that the delay in mining in the Geddes
27
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case was the far longer one of eight years, with no
particular effort being made by defendants to work
or in any way develop thenmining interest.
By way of contrast, and to show how the nonforfeiture principles of the Geddes case apply here
with especial strength, let it be pointed out that
here the total elapsed time before filing of suit was
only about one and a half years instead of eight.
Too, here the defendant continued throughout to
seek to promote the development of the tract, which
was not the case in the Geddes matter.
In summation the majority opinion says-and
we submit that the conclusion is here manifestly
appropriate:
"The real question in this case may thus
be viewed from any angle, and still we arrive
at the same conclusion, namely, that under
the contract the defendants did not obligate
themselves to do things the district court has
required of them, and hence the judgment of
that court cannot be sustained."
The error of the district court in imposing
obligations never assumed by the parties is pointed
up by the forceful ruling of this court in another
and fairly recent case, Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co.
(1947) 112 Utah 149, 185 Pac. (2d) 747.
In that case this court, reviewing and reversing
a lower court holding that lessee had lost mi11eral
28
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rights by not exploring beyond the specific requirements of the contract, held the parties wrote the
contract and that it had no such implied provision
for forfeiture ..
The court pointed out that there were specific
obligations laid upon defendant, that these provided ample consideration, and that no others should
be implied.
In the present case also, there are specific obligations also. Not to repeat unduly, these include,
among others, a conditional obligation to pay $5,500,
an absolute obligation to secure a prompt survey,
an obligation to pay to plaintiff Best a minimum
rental of $250.00 per year starting in 1959, and so
on. (Exhibit B to complaint) These and others
were performed plainly afford adequate consideration ; and the court erred grievously in assuming
that mysteriously the defendant assumed other
onerous and unstated obligations which were somehow breached.

C.

Even If, Contrary To The Obvious Facts
And The Overwhelming Preponderence Of The Evidence, Defendant Should Be Deemed To Have Committed A Breach, Such Breach Could In No Manner
Warrant The Harsh Relief Of Forfeiture.

As elsewhere discussed, we belive it is clear
no breach of this contract on defendant's part has
29
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occurred. To the contrary, we submit the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence, that defendant
has most conscientiously carried out obligations laid
upon it by a contract entered into by the parties.
Even if, however, a contrary view could be
taken, it· is crystal clear under the evidence that
such breach would be no proper occasion for the extraordinarily harsh and drastic remedy of forfeiture.
The evidence shows clearly that the assignment
of the lease was signed in June, 1953 ( R. 9) . Surveyors were engaged for a mining survey in August,
1953 (R. 65). That summer, in pursuance of the
agreement, the defendant corporation was duly
formed (R. 61). A mining engineer was employed
in August, 1953 (R. 65). Reports were received in
June and October, 1953.
In April, 1954, an extremely unfavorable
Atomic Energy Commission report was received,
and an engineer employed to interpret and explain
it (R. 71).
In June, July and August, 1954, defendant's
president traveled to New York and contacted
various firms to enlist their aid with regard to the
property (R. 72, 75, 85).
In October, a communication was received
from a Los Angeles mining firm dealing with de-

so
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fendant's efforts to interest the firm, and the firm's
appreciation of defendant's efforts (Defendant's
Exhibit 4).
Efforts continued, and a deal regarding the
lease was arranged ( R. 130).
The instant suit was filed on November 10,
1954.
From the above it is obvious that defendant's
efforts to fulfill its obligations were continuing, and
extended right down to the time of the filing of the
complaint. It is also obvious that the reports were
uniformly unfavorable.
Further, no more than about sixteen months in
all elapsed between the execution of the assignment
and the filing of suit.
Therefore, it is submitted that even if a breach
could be deemed to have been committed, it was
neither long continued, nor substantial, nor was it
an intentional repudiation of any of defendant's
obligations.
Under these circumstances, declaration of a
forfeiture would be a shock to conscience and a violation of legal principles and precedent. If plaintiff were entitled to a remedy, which is strongly
denied, that remedy should not be the drastic one
of forfeiture.
31
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In the case of Alford v. Dennis (Kan. 1918)
170 Pac. 1006 even where it appeared that defendant might have committed some breach, the harsh
remedy of forfeiture was denied. The trial court
was instead directed either to fix damages or to
require defendants "to proceed in good faith to
prospect and develop plaintiffs lands within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the trial court." (Page
1007.)
In language generally appropriate to the present case, the reviewing court stated:
"The plaintiff asks the court to cancel
this contract, to decree a forfeiture of it, and
not for default of any expressed provision of
the contract, but merely for default of one
of its implied covenant.s. The instances are
rare where equity will enforce a forfeiture.
It will never do so where less drastic redress
will satisfy the demands of justice. Brewster
v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801, 72 C. C. A.
213. Forfeitures of oil and gas leases for
breaches of mere implied covenants are seldom decreed. Davis v. Gas Co., 78 Kan. 97, 96
Pac. 47; Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., supra;
Thornton's Law Relating to Oil and Gas (2d
Ed.) §§ 91, 157."
Similarly, forfeiture for breach was denied in
the case of Hower·ton v. Gas Co., 81 Kan. 553, 106
Pac. 47, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 34;-Id., 82 Kan. 367, 108
Pac. 813, 34 L.R.A. ( N.S.) 46.
32
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As in the Alford case, the cause was remanded
either to determine damages or to require drilling
within a reasonable time.
Plainly, the relief of forfeiture is likewise totally i~appropriate in the instant case.
We submit plaintiff is entitled to no relief; but
were a different conclusion reasonable, still forfeiture would be far too harsh a remedy.

*

* *

*

Another cogent reason that forfeiture is an
inappropriate remedy is that the development of
the property was, under the evidence, only an incidental objective of plaintiff Best in entering into the
contract. His primary objective, as shown both by
the agreement itself and by his own written and oral
admissions was to obtain his opportunity for the
$5,500; and it was because he did not receive the
$5,500 that this action was commenced. This will be
shown by specific record citations.
Under this state of the facts, the cases are plain
that plaintiff cannot obtain forfeiture where the
breach is only a covenant which is only incidental
to the primary purpose.
We turn now to an examination of the facts in
this case. It may first be observed that the agreement itself (attached as an exhibit to the complaint
33
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of plaintiff) provides for the payment of $5,500
upon certain cont~encies (which, as more fully
stated elsewhere, did not come to pass). The agreement notably provides for additional minimum rental payments to plaintiff commencing in 1959,
against royalty payments. Thus the parties plainly
made their own interpretation of 1959 as the time
before which defendant should not be required to
mine if the tunnel in the adjacent property did not
intersect with the leased property.
But we do not need to rely upon such reasonable
but indirect interpretation as to whether it was the
$5,500 contingently payable or mining development
that was the princip#inducement and consideration
to plaintiff Best. Let us examine his own letter of
September 9, 1953, to Mr. Stern. This letter is attached as Exhibit A to plaintiff's Request for Admission of March 12, 1955. It is in evidence by stipulation and was in part also orally read into the
record ( R. 33.)
In this letter Plaintiff Best himself specifically states:
"Therefore because I do need some cash
which is the original reason that consideration was ever given to transferring the
school section . . ."
Reinforcing still further his written admission,
plaintiff Best himself acknowledged orally in court
that it was because he wanted $5,500, and not be34
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cause he wanted mining development, that he instituted the present action. At page 52 of the Reporter's Transcript, in response to a question as to
whether he had ever been offered $5,500 by defendant prior to commencement of suit, plaintiff revealingly testified:
''A. No. That's why I started suit to get
the property back."
The reason that plaintiff did not get his $5,500
is plain. None of the contingencies upon which the
parties contracted that he should receive it actually
occurred, and defendant was left with the dismal
and difficult task of attempting to further the interests of the property even though ingress meant
digging no mine, and the reports, elsewhere cited,
were miserably unfavorable.
However, what is of interest is the open acknowledgment by the plaintiff that he started the
present action not because of any supposed delinquency with regard to breach of a proposed covenant
regarding mining, but rather because he did not
receive the $5,500 which obviously he was not entitled to receive. Nonetheless, plaintiff did have the
full opportunity to receive that $5,500 if events
turned out as he himself stated and contracted that
they should. That this was the real and sufficient
consideration can hardly be disputed on the basis of
the above.
35
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The cases are clear that where a contract is
substantially fulfilled it cannot be forfeited even
for breach, if the breach is of a promise which is not
the principal consideration.
This was the holding in the case of Watchorn
v. Roxana Petroleum Corp. (1925) 5 Fed. (2d) --636.
In stating and holding to this effect, the court's opinion in the Watchorn case laid down the principle
In extremely appropriate language, herewith
quoted:
'' ... it is well established that where a
contract is substantially executed it cannot be
rescinded for breach of covenant incidental to
its main purpose. The remedy is recovery
of damages for the breach. Howe v. Howe &
Owen Ball Bearing Co., et al., 154 F. 820, 83
C.C.A. 536; Kauffman v. Raeder, et al., 108
F. 171, 47 C.C.A. 278, 54 L.R.A. 247; Neenan
v. Otis Elevator Co. (C.C.) 180 F. 997; Oscar
Barnett Foundry Co. v. Crowe, 219 F. 450,
135 C. C.A. 162."
Therefore, even if a breach by defendant be
assumed, it was neither substantial, long continued,
nor with regard to the primary purpose of the contract. Under familiar principles of equity, the judgment of the trial court granting forfeiture would
still be far too harsh, and a different decree more
soundly based upon equitable principles would require to be framed.
36
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXPLICITLY FIND OR CONCLUDE THAT THE CONTRACT OF DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF BEST WAS
UNENFORCEABLE BY REASON OF LACK OF MUTUALITY; BUT IF SUCH FINDING OR CONCLUSION
BE DEEMED IMPLICIT, IT IS TOTALLY CONTRARY
TO ALL EVIDENCE AND TO THE AUTHORITIES.

The trial court made no conclusion of law indicating its decision was in any manner based upon
lack of mutuality of obligation. If, however, any
such implied conclusion could somehow be drawn
from the somewhat ambiguous Finding of Fact 7:
"The Agreement provided that the defendant in this action could abandon the contemplated enterprise with impunity,"
then such finding and conclusion are in no wise
supported by the evidence or precedent. Hence they
could not possibly support the judgment of the trial
court.
As is stated in 1 Williston on Contracts, 504:
"It is often stated as if it were a requisite in the formation of contracts that
there must be mutuality. This statement is
likely to cause confusion and, however limited,
is at best an unnecessary way of saying that
there must be valid consideration."
hf e~hJA Lir"Y, iS. 4fc_ k',.•IV (],While of course,J.f there is Initially a right of
immediate cancellation without notice and without
fulfillment of any obligation whatever, there is in
the instant case no such factual situation.
37
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The original agreement here, incorporated into
the complaint, shows clearly that, before defendant
could have the right to exercise the abandonment
clause, it was obligated:
1.

To hire a surveyor to survey the leasehold;

2. To pay $5,500 if the surveyor's report
showed that an adjoining tunnel run to the edge
of the property, or if Atomic Energy Commission
reports were favorable;
3. To pay certain traveling expenses of the
assignor at the time the $5,500 might become payable;
4. To keep the lease in good standing by paying necessary rental while these other obligations
were being carried forward.
The above does not exhaust the necessary obligations of defendant; but it suffices to show that
there were many obligations of defendant under the
contract.
The matters show ample consideration for the
assignment-and consideration which has been executed.
Thus plaintiff cannot avoid the contract by asserting that at some later point, after the defendant's undertaking many obligations and giving
much consideration, the defendant might be able
38
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under the contract to exercise a right to cancel, upon
certain further considerations. There is no way of
segregating out consideration and saying that certain of the agreements have consideration and other
do not; this is contrary to precedent and principle.
As is said in the California case of Tennant
v. Wilde (1929) 98 Cal. App. 437, 277 Pac. 137,

139:
" ... it may be said that, where there is
consideration for any of the agreements specified in a contract the contract as a whole cannot be said to lack mutuality or consideration,
nor can any particular promise or agreement
contained therein be singled out and deemed
inoperative because no special or particular
consideration appears to have been given or
promised for it."
See also authorities there cited; and Hill v.
General Petroleum Corp. (1932) 128 Cal. App. 284,
l6 Pac: (2d) 1035; and authorities cited at 12 Am.
Jur. 511.
Here we have the situation of plaintiff Best
having assigned his interest under the State of Utah
lease to defendant.
Yet even in the weaker situation of the granting of a license, Utah courts have held that this too
might and did become irrevocable where money
was spent in good faith in reliance upon a continuance of the license. Kennedy Combined Metals Re39
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duction Co. (1935) 87 Utah 532 51 Pac (2d) 1064.
See also Migliacco v. Davis (1951) 120 Utah 1, 232
Pac (2d) 195.
Defendant's Duty of Assignment on Abandonment Would Itself Furnish Consideratrion.
l-

It should also be pointed out that any right to
abandon the contract at any time, even after the
giving of ample separate consideration, is expressly
accompanied by the duty of reassignment imposed
by the contract itself, which states, (See Exhibit
B to Complaint) :
''In the event of the abandonment of said
mine, assignee must reassign said lease to
assignor.''
It is the correct rule, and is generally held, that
where, as here, the right of abandonment is coupled
with a detriment, such as the one here involved of
reassignment, this is sufficient to meet the requirement of valid consideration. See authorities cited
at 1 Williston on Contracts 365 and Brewster v.
Lanyon Zinc Co. (C.C.A. 8, 1905) 140. 801, 811-12.
There were many obligations imposed on defendant, and it filfilled them; and it expended time,
money and effort with regard to the property. Further, even the requirement of reassignment upon a
closing out of the contract would furnish consideration.
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Thus, in the light of the foregoing, it is submitted that from any viewpoint, any effort must
fail which would seek to support the erroneous judgment of the trial court on the basis of supposed lack
of mutual~ty.
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND INJUSTICE IN PERMITTING AMENDMENT AS TO PARTIES PLAINTIFF AT
THE TRIAL WITHOUT SWORN TESTIMONY, WHILE
AT THE· SAME TIME DENYING TO DEFENDANT
THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THE IMPORTANT ISSUE
OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST, WHICH DEFEN-DANT HAD SPECIFICALLY RAISED AS AN ISSUE
BY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN ITS ANSWER.

In the instant case the trial court permitted
and indeed insisted without sworn testimony upon
the entry of an amendment to the pleading including
a new party as the owner of one-half of the original
party's claim.
This was done, apparently, because the trial
court felt that its pretrial order limited the issues
and excluded the issue of whether plaintiff Best in
fact ·cheld the claim at the time of commencement of
suit. Yet in point of fact, and contrary to the plain
mandate of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial
court in fact made no formal order following the
pretrial ( R. 42), and the defendant had sharply
and specifically raised the issue of ownership in its
answer, which issue the trial court nevertheless excluded from those triable at the trial.
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Nonetheless, the trial court, in accordance with
the request of plaintiff Best's counsel, heard such
evidence as st1ch plaintiff wished to present on the
subject of ownership. This consisted solely and exclusively of the testimony, totally unsworn, of one
of the plaintiff's counsel. Permitting no rebuttal
of such testimony, the trial court acted upon it and
upon it exclusively, and entered its order amending
the pleadings to add plaintiff Craig as a party
plaintiff.

*

*

* *

While the above statements may seem startling
and exaggerated, each of them is exactly correct,
and will be demonstrated to be so in the body of this
section of appellant's brief.
The defendant in its answer sharply raised the
question of whether title was in plaintiff Best when
the suit was brought.
Its answer stated at Paragraph 8 thereof:
"That the plaintiff is not the real party
in interest in this action and that the plaintiff has assigned to another person or persons his right to receive 16%% of the gross
mill receipts after first deducting from the
gross mill receipts 12%% of the said mill receipts which said 12%% is paid to the State
of Utah as part of the rent for the said leasehold."
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A pretrial hearing was held on March 28, 1955.
Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:
"The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the
amendments allowed to.the pleadings, and the
agreements made by the parties as to any of
the matters considered, and which limits the
issues for trial to those not disposed of by
admissions or agreements of counsel; and
such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action; unless modified
at the trial to prevent manifest injustice."
It nowhere appears in the record, despite the
rule's plain provision that the "court shall make an
order which recites the action taken at the conference ... and which limits the issues for trial," that
any such written order or any order at all was made
by the trial court.
Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary; and
shows plainly that the trial court did not prepare a
pretrial order, though it admitted that it should
have done so. We quote from the record (R. 42),
with Mr. Arnovitz, trial counsel for defendant,
speaking:
"Now in justification of my position in
this, I asked, and I don't criticize the reporter,
and I take it for granted the reporter has
plenty of business to do. But at that time in
order to be sure, the courts generally make
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up an arder, at least in our district, and say
these are the issues.
"THE COURT: Now listen, on that I
dictated that off. Just almost like you read it.
And I asked you fellows if you thought that
I need prepare a formal order and both of
you said no.
"MR. ARNOVITZ: Well I don't know
if that is in here. Is it, I don't know. I don't
recall that is in here. I don't recall the court
asking whether to prepare a formal order or
not.
"THE COURT: Well I should have
written a pretrial order. I thought that this
here was a simple lawsuit that we have, with
all those four or five problems I set them out.
"MR. ARNOVITZ: And, Your Honor,
when I asked for the order I did it with the
idea that I would then have before me the
order so if there was anything that needed
to be called to the court's attention I would
have it. Now it didn't come."
That such pretrial order, gravely affecting as it
does the entire course of the proceedings, is to be
written one, would be obvious even without precedent. But of course the cases exist, though we need
not here multiply citations. Let us simply take for
example a case under the similar Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 16. It is that of Clark v. United
States, (D. C., Oregon, 1952) 18 Fed. -Rules Service 16.21, Case 1; 13 F.R.D. 342. Here it is made
perfectly clear that the pretrial order is to be in
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writing. Indeed, it should be drafted by counsel for
the parties, since it is in effect a pleading. This is
the view strongly taken in the above case, written
by District Judge (now Ninth Circuit Judge) Fee.
It is plain that the total absence of such a written pretrial order contributed largely to the confusion, and to the error of the trial court in denying
to plaintiff the right to litigate the weighty and
pleaded issue of real pary in interest. The trial
court treated pretrial as limiting issues irrevocably,
as far as defendant was concerned; yet no actual
order ever issued from the pretrial hearing.
Plaintiff Best's original complaint did not allege that anyone but himself was a proper plaintiff
party in interest. Nor was any effort made by plaintiff prior to trial to amend the complaint to include
anyone else as a plaintiff.
On the other hand, as above stated, in Paragraph 8 of its answer defendant denied sharply that
Best was the only or the proper party in interest.
With the foregoing history, it seems clear that
the defendant had raised the issue of real party in
interest, and had not been foreclosed by the pretrial
order (for there was no such order) from pursuing
such issue.
As the court itself said with regard to this
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issue, this is an important issue and one which was
pleaded. To quote:
''... of course this matter is quite substantial, this question of party in interest.
But on the other hand you had pleaded that.
Of course, I think counsel should call it to the
court's attention, but nevertheless, the problem is still there." ( R. 38. )
The trial court regarded it as important, but
plaintiff's counsel, who admitted he had known for
months of another interest being involved (R. 39)
nonetheless had made no move to amend the pleadings prior to trial. Speaking of Earl Craig, the person later in trial added as plaintiff, Mr. Baucom,
trial counsel for plaintiff Best, declared:
"I didn't think it was substantial, I really
didn't think anything about it." (R. 40.)
The trial court (R. 45) granted the motion to
make Earl Craig a party plaintiff. This was done
entirely without any sworn evidence being placed
before the trial court, on the basis of the unsworn
comments, not subject to cross-examination or rebuttal, of Mr. Baucom, trial counsel for plaintiff
Best. These unsworn comments appear principally
at page 38 and 39 of the reporter's trial transcript.
The granting of the motion to add Craig as a
party plaintiff was, then, plainly based upon no
substantial evidence.
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No personal criticism of plaintiff's counsel is
intended or should be implied; but it is an old and
sound tradition of our Anglo-American common law,
supported by many precedents, that a trial attorney
should not testify as to substantial and important
issues involved in the case he is trying. And the
fallacy of basing a decision on an important issue
on such testimony, and such testimony alone, is
glaringly magnified when the testimony of the attorney is merely unsworn comment.
To carry its error still further, the trial court
sternly refused to permit counsel for defendant even
to inquire into the subject. (R. 35.)
Late in the trial, defendant's counsel sought to
go into the question as to whether Best "has any
interest left in this property at all, as to whether
he is a proper party plaintiff at all." (R. 134)
Mter further colloquy, the trial court specifically forbade further questioning and stated with
regard to the question of real party in interest:
"Well, I will preclude you from that investigation." (R. 135)
Thus, by the foregoing chain of events and rulings, defendant was totally barred from litigating
an important issue it had pleaded, while on the other
hand the plaintiff was permitted and ordered to
amend its pleadings on the basis of the unsworn
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testimony of plaintiff's counsel, of which no rebuttal was permitted.
That this was serious and reversible error admits of no question. It leaves totally unsupported
the status of the plaintiff as real parties in interest,
and foreclosed the right of defendant to litigate this
question.
Under previous rules of procedure, such rulings
have in the past required reversal by this Court of
trial court judgments. Thus, in Skews v. Dunn
(1882), 3 Utah 186, 2 Pac. 64, this -Court held that
the trial court erred reversibly in substituting one
plaintiff for another, in violation of principles
governing determination of the real party in interest.
Turning for interpretation of our modern rules
on pretrial to decisions under the similar Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, we find that the federal
cases condemn the failure to have a written pretrial
order "well before the trial." Reversal was held
required in Burton v. liV eyerl~aeused Timber Co.
(U.S.D.C. Ore., 1941) 4 Fed Rules Service~ 16.32,
Case 2, because of confusion arising over certain
issues at the trial.
The failure in reg·ard to the pretrial order was
emphasized as a ca&al factor in the confusion which
required reversal.
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In this general regard another federal case and
its principles should be noted. It is true that the instant case does not even involve an actual pretrial
order duly prepared. But even if it did involve such
an order, the rigidity and inflexibility of the trial
court would be error.
This is well illiustrated by the case of Geopulos
v. Mandes (U.S.D.C., Dist. of Columbia 1940) 4
Federal Rules eSrvice, 16.33, case 1. Here the issue
of laches was apparently waived by defendant. However, where this was shown to be inadvertent, and
where defendant had earlier tried to assert this
issue amendment was permitted to include this issue in the pretrial order. The guiding principle is
that where rigid adherence to the issue set down in
the pretrial order will cause injustice, these issues
may be enlarged.
CONCLUSION
We believe we have shown clearly that there
was in this case no forfeiture, no abandonment, no
lack of mutuality. We believe the trial court also
erred reversibly in prohibiting to defendant exploration of the pleaded issue of real party in interest, while at the same time permitting and ordering amendment as to parties plaintiff on the unsworn testimony of plaintiff's counsel. It is submitted that justice requires the reversal of the trial
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court, to avoid effects of an unjust forfeiture declared against defendant.
Worthy counsel for respondents will try to es..
cape the inescapable facts of trial court errors, by
citing some matters or cases not specifically referred to in this brief. Yet the fatal errors are in
the record, and we believe will remain there despite
all efforts of respondents to deal with them.
It is respectfully submitted and prayed that
this Honorable Court, by reason of each of the errors
discussed in earlier sections of this brief, should
reverse the judgment of the trial court and grant
defendant a judgment to avoid a most inequitable
and legally unwarranted forfeiture.
Respectfully submitted,
WHITE, ARNOVITZ & SMITH
Associate, LAWRENCE W.
STEINBERG
Attorneys for Appellant
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